I. Introduction
Measuring labor's share of an economy's aggregate income seems straightforward, at least in principle. Count up wage and salary income, along with the value of benefits provided to employees, and divide it by total income. However, one fundamental concept of labor's share in macroeconomic theory is not the amount of aggregate income paid out to labor. Rather, it is the share of aggregate production that is attributable to "raw" units of labor. Or, otherwise stated, it is the share of aggregate income that would have been paid to laborers if they had no accumulated stocks of human capital. 1 This share corresponds to an aggregate production function parameter: the elasticity of output with respect to physical (i.e. non-augmented or raw) units of labor (Robert Solow, 1957) .
In this paper we estimate annual raw labor's share for the US, 1949 to 1996.
Alan Krueger (1999) provides, to our knowledge, the only other such measure for a comparable time period in the US. 2 His measure is based on (Jacob) Mincerian (1974) regressions using Census data, at the level of the individual, on earnings, schooling, and work experience. 3 Interpreting the intercept of such regressions as "raw" labor earnings, Krueger (1999, Krueger's (1999, p. 50) conclusion: "Raw labor's share . . . declined since 1979, which is not surprising in view of the well-documented rise in the return to education and experience in this period." 6 This is certainly plausible. One interpretation is that the growth rate of the marginal productivity of human capital increased during the relevant time period. A competing -or, better, complementary -interpretation is that compensation to raw labor fell or grew slowly relative human capital's compensation.
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The approach to calculating raw labor's share pursued in this paper hopefully can lend some insight into the relative validity of these two interpretations.
Our approach differs in that, rather than estimating raw labor earnings from observations on a broad sample of workers, we use direct observations on the wage rates of uneducated and inexperienced workers. Our preferred measure of raw labor's share is considerably higher than that reported by Krueger with a high of nearly 30.9 percent in 1949 and a low of 12.4 percent in 1974. Furthermore, unlike the Krueger measure which falls from 1979 onward, our measure rises during the later part of the sample and is over 22 percent by 1996. 4 We will adopt Krueger's terminology, raw labor's share, for the remainder of the paper to distinguish the particular concept from other conceptualizations of labor's share, e.g., compensation of employees as a share of aggregate income. 5 This is based on a conventionally-estimated NIPA labor's share of 76.1 percent in 1996 (Krueger, 1999, Table1) . 6 The rise in the return to education has been attributed to skill-biased technical change that outpaced a growing supply of educated labor (Lawrence Katz and Kevin Murphy, 1992) and was perhaps even induced by that growing supply (Daron Acemoglu, 2002) . 7 This would be consistent with the claim that weakening labor market institutions -e.g. labor unions and the minimum wage -underlies the fall in labor's share. Katz and David Autor (1999) , Claudia Goldin and Katz (2001) , and Acemoglu (2002) review the relevant literature. For evidence and discussion of the anemic growth in the earnings of lower income groups (and its growth relative to the earnings of higher income groups) see John Willis and Julie Wroblewski (2007) .
This paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides an exposition of both Krueger's (1999) Krueger's (1999) data for comparison's sake. Section IV presents our results, compares and contrasts them to those of Krueger (1999) , and suggests possible reasons for the differences. Section V concludes with some commentary on the relative virtues of each approach and possible reasons for their different implications when brought to the data.
II. Two Approaches to Measuring Raw Labor's Share
Krueger (1999, p. 49) begins with the assumption that, "each worker's earnings consist of two additive components: raw labor and human capital". Based on this assumption, Krueger estimates a Mincerian earnings regression of the form,
where W i are a given worker's (i's) annual earnings, S i is years of schooling, X i is a measure of "potential" experience (i's age minus S i minus 6), and e i is an error term.
Given the mean square error of the regression, σ 2 , earnings attributable to raw labor are then computed as W 0 = exp(b 0 + 0.5σ 2 ).
While Krueger (1999, p. 49 ) is careful to note several caveats about this measure (e.g., the minimum wage may raise the regression intercept), it is undoubtedly an intuitive way of separating education's and experience's -taken together, human capital's -contributions to earnings. 8 The earnings attributable to raw labor, or what "might more appropriately be called 'intercept labor'" (Krueger, 1999, p. 49) , are that component of total earnings not accounted for by proxies for human capital.
Given the raw labor earnings measure, it is straightforward to approximate the share of labor income accruing to raw labor,
, where n is the number of workers. Taking this share of total labor income as a fraction of national income yields a measure of raw labor's share.
In this paper we pursue an alternative approach. Rather than effectively estimate earnings accruing to raw labor, we directly observe the earnings of "raw" labor units.
Krueger's approach samples workers with various levels of human capital and then attempts to control for those human capital levels in a regression. Alternatively, we identify individual workers with no (or very little) experience and schooling and use their earnings to calculate a raw wage rate. Along with a measure of total labor hours, this raw wage rate implies a raw labor's share of total income.
Both approaches to measuring raw labor's share begin with an assumption of what (roughly) constitutes a raw laborer, i.e., an adult with no formal education that has had no market employment. 9 In one sense this is arbitrary. Human capital accumulation also includes all of the informal education and experiences from birth and onward. However, physical maturity seems to be important for what most would consider a baseline labor 8 The minimum wage may also increase the relative share of unskilled employment, so the net effect on the share of raw labor is not clear. 9 Recall that potential experience in the Krueger regression is age minus education minus 6. This implies that, e.g., that an 18 year old high school (12 th grade) graduate has potential experience of zero. Our baseline raw wage rate below is based on a more liberal definition of "adult", namely at least 16 years old. An alternative raw wage rate series we examine ups the minimum age considered to 18 years old.
unit. So a raw labor unit is conceived of as levels of experience and education relative to the minimum that an adult would be expected to embody.
III. Data
We utilize the 1948 to 1996 US data set studied by Jorgenson and Stiroh (1999) which is based on an aggregate production function, horizontal trend (Figure 1) . This represents labor income as a share of value-added.
Figure 1 also plots Krueger's (1999) raw labor's share which is significantly lower and falling throughout the 1980s and 1990s. These observations are based on his estimation of (1) using Census data and, for the 1997 measure, CPS data on individuals'
earnings, years of schooling, and workplace experience. Estimated "intercept labor"
earnings are then taken as a share of national income from the BEA.
Our calculation of raw labor's share is based on comparable (Census and CPS) data. We go into the labor matrices of Ho and Jorgenson (1999) and focus on workers who have virtually no human capital in terms of experience and educational attainment.
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Specifically, as our baseline we focus on male employees, 16 to 17 years of age, with 8 th grade education or less. 13 The ages of these workers rule out any substantial on-the-job experience and their formal schooling is nil; they are actual, observable raw units of labor. For these workers we have data on compensation and hours worked, yielding a nominal compensation per hour (or wage) rate. This wage rate is then deflated using the output price index (PY) from the Jorgenson and Stiroh (1999) 13 We choose to begin with male workers to avoid issues of gender discrimination and we avoid the selfemployed based on the assumption that they are perhaps, in general, exceptionally motivated and/or naturally possessing of organizational skills. Below we demonstrate that focusing on women does not alter the results in any meaningful way.
worked (H) were compensated at that rate. That hypothetical wage bill as a fraction of total output (Y) is our baseline raw labor's share.
IV. Raw Labor's Share
Figure 2 plots our raw labor's share as well as Krueger's (1999) measure. Our measure is in general higher, averaging just under 0.22 (Table 1 ; column 2). 14 Also, it appears to trend upwards through the 1980s and 1990s unlike the falling Krueger One unfortunate feature of this raw labor's share series is that is very volatile, evidenced by its standard deviation -over 2.5 times that of labor service's share. This 14 The average is only slightly lower -just under 0.20 -if we consider only 1959 through 1996, which encompasses the Krueger points displayed in the figure. As well, Krueger (1999, Furthermore, as a robustness check we also calculate a raw labor's share based on female data for the same age and education levels (Figure 3) . The average value is slightly bit lower than that of the baseline series (0.182 versus 0.220) but is otherwise similar. Time trend estimations corresponding to (3) and (4) above yielded, The estimated trends are essentially identical to those of the baseline series and are both significant at the 1 percent level. (The series based on female data is also volatile as in the baseline case; see Table 1 , column 3.)
Why might Krueger's (1999) measure of raw labor's share fall from the 1980s on while ours does not? Figure 4 demonstrates the results of an experiment designed to hint 15 Mun Ho helpfully provided these numbers in discussion of the volatility of the series.
at some answers. It plots (i) our baseline raw labor's share measure, (ii) a hypothetical labor's share calculated using males with marginally more education, i.e., some high school but no diploma, and (iii) a second hypothetical labor's share calculated using males with marginally more potential work experience, i.e., aged 18 to 24 years. The idea is to see how the average level and trends in raw labor's share change when we (hypothetically) use wage rates based on incremental increases, along two separate margins, in the human capital of the type of labor unit considered.
In case (ii) the hypothetical labor's share displays a mildly upward trend from 1949 to 1996. A time trend regression for the entire sample period yields,
LS SOME_HS = 0.186 + 0.001*T, and the trend is significant at the 1 percent level. The mean is just above 0.20 while the minimum and maximum values, respectively, are around 0.18 and 0.25. The volatility of the series is less than labor service's share with a relative standard deviation around 0.74 (Table 1; column 5) . Surprisingly, it is consistently lower than our baseline measure until 1965. This begs the question of why labor with marginally more education consistently earned less than their uneducated counterparts. 16 A sensible answer may be that they were often still in school and their earnings, to great extent, represent those from after school/weekend jobs. Therefore, they are not available as "full-time" labor units and had lower marginal products as such. More interesting, to us in any case, is that there is again no evidence of a fall is this hypothetical labor's share during the 1980s or 1990s.
An implication of this is that the labor market essentially treats people with some high school education, but no diploma, as the productive equivalent of our concept of raw labor.
On the other hand, case (iii) presents us with a hypothetical labor's share that is both higher on average than the baseline (which we would expect) and is falling; not only These trends are both significant at the 1 percent level and, in contrast to the baseline case, the negative trend is more pronounced from 1970 on. The series' mean is about 0.335 and it is about twice as volatile of labor's services share ( Table 1 ; column 4). This is the case based on a wage rate of marginally more experienced labor units (18 to 24 years of age). Taken with our baseline raw labor's share, case (iii) suggests that the relative marginal productivity of raw labor that has not fallen but, rather, the marginal productivity of experience (at least at low levels).
V. Discussion and Conclusions
Why is our measure of raw labor's share higher on average than Krueger's (1999) measure over the post-WWII period through 1996, and why does our measure not fall like Krueger's does from 1979 onward?
As far as the average difference is concerned, one possibility is that, whereas
Krueger does include both linear and squared terms of experience in his regressions, a squared term for schooling should also be included. If the slope of the earnings curve increases in educational-attainment, then the intercept may be underestimated. Another possibility is the estimated marginal productivity relationships in Krueger are correct but that the formal (and perhaps informal) minimum wage rate is higher than the estimated intercept. Using a full sample of experience-level and schooling-level individuals might yield a best fitting line that intercepts below that minimum wage rate. In other words, raw labor would earn a certain wage rate if it was paid its marginal product, but that wage rate is below some socially-acceptable minimum level.
As far as the downward trend in raw labor's share detected by Krueger (1999) , a plausible interpretation is that the relative returns to raw labor have been falling but the socially-acceptable returns to raw labor have not fallen at pace. We do find a falling labor's share when considering marginally more experienced individuals. This may be because 18 to 24 year olds, in general, have not been paid at actual wage rates near the socially-acceptable minimum. Therefore, their relative actual compensation has been falling along with their relative returns. 
